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Multiple Interests in Riparian Land,
Subdivision Platting, And The
Allocation of Riparian Rights*
SHELDON J. PLAGER** AND FRANK E. MALONI-Y*:*
INTRODUCTION
Ownership of a tract of land which abuts on a navigable waterbody
entitles the owner of the land to riparian rights.' The number and type of
these rights have apparently not been limited by the amount of riparian
footage owned, nor have they generally been limited by the angle
which the boundary of the property makes with the water's edge.2 The
more difficult problems arise in determining whether a particular tract in
fact abuts on a navigable body of water, and what ownership interests,
riparian and otherwise, exist in the tract. The first problem is to decide
where the water's edge is-a matter of drawing a legal line between land
and water. The second problem is to determine whether the legal
description of the tract makes the legal line one of the tract's boundaries.
The third problem results from having more than one ownership
abutting on the same waterbody at the same place. This occurs, for
example, when there is an easement for road purposes superimposed on
land abutting on a waterbody. The allocation of riparian rights among
or between the owner of the fee, the holder of the easement, and perhaps
even the original dedicator, is a matter of some complexity?
*The preparation of this article has been supported by the Office of Water Resources Research,
United States Department of the Interior, as authorized under the Water Resources Research Act
of 1964, Public Law 88-379. Portions of this article have been adapted from material which will
appear in a forthcoming book on water law and administration. Copyright is, therefore, reserved in
the author.
**Professor of Law, University of Illinois.
***Dean and Professor of Law, University of Florida, Gainesville.
I. See generally I FARNIAM. WAThRS AND WATER RIGHTS § 60 et. seq. (1904) [hereinafter
cited as FARNHAM].
2. See generally Bade, Title, Points and Lines in Lakes and Streams, 24 MINN. L. REv. 305
(1940); Annot., 65 A.L.R.2d 143 (1959).
3. An analogous problem is created when a riparian owner attempts to subdivide his own land
in such a way as to make non-riparian back lots with access to the water body through artificially
created canals. So long as the water body is sufficiently large that no riparian rights of other
property owners or rights of the public are significantly affected, the status of the back lot owners is
not likely to be called into question. However, when smaller water bodies such as lakes are involved,
frictions may develop between the other riparian owners and the subdivider or his grantee. In this
case, the Court is faced with the problem of allocating riparian use rights among competing
claimants of various property interests. This problem as well as the one dealt with in the text can be
expected to become more common. See. e.g., Thomson v. Entz, 379 Mich. 667, 154 N.W.2d 473
(1967).
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THE LINE BETWEEN LAND AND WATER: HIGH AND Low WATER MARKS
Choosing the Water Mark
The line at which the upland stops and the water begins is referred
to as the high water mark (sometimes the ordinary high water mark).
The line below which the water usually does not drop is the low water
mark. The space between the high and low water marks is typically
called the shore, or, sometimes, the foreshore. If the waterbody is not
affected by regular tides, such as an inland fresh water lake, the high
water mark may be quite stable, so that as a practical matter there is
only the one water line, and no shore as such. In some areas with
periodic wet and dry seasons, however, there may be over an extended
period of time a clearly discernible change in the level of nontidal waters.
If the waterbody is subject to daily tides, such as the lower reaches of a
watercourse emptying into the ocean, there usually will be clearly
discernible high and low water marks, as well as a well-defined shore.
The logical point to differentiate between land and water is the high
water mark. The law, both statutory and case, has generally recognized
this,4 although in some situations legal significance is attached to the low
water mark.' Generally, then, the high water mark is the line to which
the upland owner must own in order to be entitled to riparian rights.
Physical Location of the Water Mark in Nontidal (fresh water)
Waterbodies
In a leading Minnesota case involving the determination of the high
water mark, the court said:6
In the case of fresh water rivers and lakes - in which there is no
ebb and flow of the tide, but which are subject to irregular and
occasional changes in height, without fixed quantity or time,
except that they are periodical, recurring with the wet or dry
seasons of the year - the high-water mark, as a line between a
riparian owner and the public, is to be determined by examining
4. E.g., Anderson v. Reames, 204 Ark. 216, 161 S.W.2d 957 (1942) (lake with clearly marked
high and low water mark); Schmidt v. Marschel, 211 Minn. 539, 2 N.W.2d 121 (1942) (riparian
owner takes title only to the high water mark of a navigable lake); State v. Thomas, 173 Iowa 408,
155 N.W. 859 (1916) (lake).
5. Vermont v. New Hampshire, 290 U.S. 579 (1934) (boundary line between states); Appeal
of York Haven Water & Power Co., 212 Pa. 622, 62 A. 97 (1905) aJJ'don other grounds, 218 Pa.
578, 67 A. 866 (1907) (boundary line between counties); Flisrand v. Madson, 35 S.D. 457, 152 N.W.
796 (1915) (riparian owners have title to low water mark); Scott v. Doughty, 124 Va. 358, 97 S.E.
802 (1919) (same); Union Sand & Gravel Co. v. Northcott, 102 W.Va. 519, 135 S.E. 589
(1926) (same).
6. In re Minnetonka Lake Improvement, 56 Minn. 513, 522, 58 N.W. 295, 297 (1894).
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the bed and banks, and ascertaining where the presence and
action of the water are so common and usual, and so long
continued in all ordinary years, as to mark upon the soil of the
lied a character distinct from that of the banks, in respect to
vegetation, as well as respects the nature of the soil itself.
An Iowa court has said that it is "the line to which high water ordinarily
reaches," and not the line reached by the water at flood stages;7 and it is
not the line ordinarily reached "by the great annual rises of the river,
which cover in places lands that are valuable for agricultural
purposes .. ."I
The Manual of Surveying Instructions9 for preparing the United
States Government Survey requires that "[a]ll navigable bodies of
water and other important rivers and lakes (as hereinafter described)
are to be segregated from the public lands at mean high-water
elevation," 0 presumably meaning the same thing as high water mark,
or ordinary high water mark. The Manual contains detailed instructions
for locating the high-water mark:
Practically all inland bodies of water pass through an
annual cycle of changes from mean low water to flood stages,
between the extremes of which will be found mean high water.
In regions of broken topography, especially where bodies of
water are bounded by sharply sloping lands, the horizontal
distance between the margins of the various water elevations is
comparatively slight, and the engineer will not experience much
difficulty in determining the horizontal position of mean high-
water level with approximate accuracy; but in level regions, or
in any locality where the meanderable bodies of water are
bordered by relatively flat lands, the horizontal distance
between the successive levels is relatively great. The engineer will
find the most reliable indication of mean high-water elevation
in the evidence made by thewater's action at its various stages,
which will generally be found well marked in the soil, and in
timbered localities a very certain indication of the locus of the
various important water levels will be found in the belting of the
native forest species.
Mean high-water elevation will be found at the margin of
the area occupied by the water for the greater portion of each
average year; at this level a definite escarpment in the soil will
7. State ex rel. O'Connor v. Sorenson, 222 Iowa 1248, 1251, 271 N.W. 234, 236 (1937).
8. Welch v. Browning, 115 Iowa 690,692,87 N.W. 430,431 (1901).
9. U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SURVEY OF
THE PUBLIC LANDS OF THE UNITED STATES (1947) [hereinafter cited as MANUAL].
10. Id. at 230.
1968]
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generally be traceable, at the top of which is the true position
for the engineer to run the meander line. A pronounced
escarpment, the result of the action of storm and flood waters,
will often be found above the principal water level, and
separated from the latter by the storm or flood beach; another
less evidence [sic] escarpment will often be found at the average
low-water level, especially of lakes, the lower escarpment being
separated from the principal escarpment by the normal beach
or shore. While these questions properly belong to the realm of
geology, they should not be overlooked in the survey of a
meander line.
Where native forest trees are found in abundance
bordering bodies of water, those trees showing evidence of
having grown under favorable site conditions will be found
accurately belted along contour lines; thus a certain class of
mixed varieties common to a particular region will be found
only on the lands seldom if ever overflowed; another group of
forest species will be found on the lands which are inundated
only a small portion of the growing season each year, and
indicate the area which should be included in the classification
of the uplands; dther varieties of native forest trees will be found
only within the zone of swamp and overflowed lands. All timber
growth normally ceases at the margin of permanent water."
A different and more complex problem is presented when the
determination involves a waterbody subject to the daily rise and fall of
the tides. 2
DETERMINING WHETHER THE LAND DESCRIPTION EXTENDS TO THE
WATER MARK
The question of whether the calls of the deed run to a waterbody is,
as in all boundary questions, a matter of intention of the grantor as
disclosed by the language of the instrument.'3 The process of
interpretation is affected by the method used in describing the realty to
be conveyed. There are two basic methods, one involving direct
description of the boundaries (usually called a "metes and bounds"
description), the other involving indirect description using a "short-
hand" label for a tract fully described in another document. This latter
method usually has as its reference either the United States Government
Survey or a private map or plat.
11. Id. at 231-32.
12. See 2 SHALOWITZ, SHORE AND SEA BOUNDARIES 171-88 (1964); Gay, The High Water
Mark: Boundary Between Public and Private Lands, 18 U. FLA. L. REV. 553 (1966).
13. See 1 PATTON, TITLES § 156 (2d ed. 1957).
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Metes and Bounds Description
Whatever the linguistic origins of the phrase "metes and bounds," 14
or verbal distinctions attributed to the words in the phrase, 1' the terms
are commonly understood today to mean a description which details in
extenso in the conveying instrument itself the boundaries of the land
conveyed. The description must always have a stated point of beginning
which can be located on the ground. This point may be a physical object
or monument, natural or artificial; it may be a point at which adjacent
property lines intersect; or it may be a point that can be determined
only by reference to other documents, such as the government survey.
From the point of beginning, the boundaries will be described by
successive courses and distances or by describing physical objects such as
fences, buildings, waterbodies, iron posts, etc., which mark sides or
corners, or by a combination of both. To be complete, the description
must "close," that is, describe a plane figure with sides that connect to
each other.
If one of the calls in the description uses terms such as "'to," ".on,"
"by," "at," or "along" a particular waterbody, the conveyed land
presumably extends to the water line, and riparian rights attach.'6 A
description using only courses and distances which on the waterbody side
is substantially coincident with the ordinary high water mark would
appear to be sufficient to convey the grantor's interest to the water's
edge, and thus carry with it the riparian rights. 7
What is the effect of a description "to the shore of Lake Blank, and
thence by (or along) (or with) the shore?" If the waterbody is a tidal
body, the "shore" has width (the distance between the high and low
water marks), and the description is ambiguous. Under these
circumstances, most courts have taken the description as intending to
exclude the land which constitutes the shore proper, and thus the
conveyed land terminates at the high water mark. 8
14. See, e.g., Adams, II SURVEYING AND MAPPING 305 (1951).
15. See, e.g., Buck v. Hardy, 6 Me. 162, 165 (1829): "By metes in strictness may be
understood the exact length of each line, and the exact quantity of land in square feet, rods, or acres.
... Metes result from bounds; and where the latter are definitely fixed, there can be no question
about the former."
16. E.g., Leary v. Jersey City, 189 F. 419, 428 (Cir. Ct. D.N.J. 1911); See SKELTON,
BOUNDARIES AND ADJACENT PROPERTIES 324 (1930); CLARKE, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
SURVEYING AND BOUNDARIES §578 (3d ed. 1959).
17. McDonald v. Whitehurst, 47 F. 757 (Cir. Ct. E.D. Va. 1891); see Skelton, supra note
16, at 315.
18. E.g., Montgomery v. Reed, 69 Me. 510 (1879); Niles v. Patch, 13 Gray (79 Mass.) 254
(1859); see Skelton, supra note 16, at 316. But cf. Wood v. Hilderbrand, 185 Md. 56, 42 A.2d 919
(Ct. App. 1945) (title extends to mean tide).
19681
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If the waterbody is a nontidal body, such as an inland lake or
stream, the question takes on an added dimension. While the ordinary
high water mark of fresh water bodies may change over periods of time
as a result of drought or excessive rainfall, there are no regularly
discernible high and low water marks and, in effect, the ordinary high
water mark is the only water mark. Consequently there is no "shore" in
the usual sense of a strip of land (sand or otherwise) between the high and
low water marks covered and uncovered by the regular ebb and
flow of the tide. In the early case of Axline v. Shaw,'9 the description in
the deed to plaintiffs upland read in part, "thence west, about thirty-six
and a half chains, to the shore of Orange Lake; thence northwesterly,
with said shore of said lake, to the north line of said section one. .. ."
Orange Lake was a nontidal, navigable, fresh water lake. Plaintiff sued
to enjoin defendant from erecting a fence and wharf in front of plaintiffs
upland, alleging that defendant's construction would interfere with
plaintiffs access to the lake. Defendant answered that plaintiff was not a
riparian owner. The court agreed:
If a boundary upon the "shore" of the lake is an equivalent
term to a boundary upon the "lake" itself, or the "waters of the
lake," then Mrs. Axline is a riparian proprietor; otherwise, she
is not. We do not think the expressions are equivalent. Her land
is bounded by the shore. The shore is land. . . .Therefore, the
boundary is land, and not water. . . .Mrs. Axline is not a
riparian owner. 20
In determining what constituted a "shore," the court did not discuss the
difference between tidal and nontidal waterbodies. 2'
Description Referring to the Government Survey
In the original colonies land grants were typically made by metes
and bounds descriptions. On May 20, 1785, the Continental Congress
enacted the "Land Ordinance of 1785," establishing the United States
Government Survey. This created a rectangular system of land
description, and in many areas of the country it has replaced the metes
19. 35 Fla. 305, 17 So. 411 (1895).
20. Id.at3lO, l7So.at413.
21. The case is unduly complicated, and the result possibly explainable, by the fact that
plaintiff apparently premised her cause of action on the State's 1856 Riparian Rights Act, rather
than on her rights as a riparian owner to ingress and egress. "The building, etc., of the fence, was not
sought to be enjoined as a nuisance per se, but the complainants stand strictly upon the [1856]
statutory riparian rights of Mrs. Axline." Id. at 35 Fla. 307, 17 So. 411, 412. This act authorized
upland owners on any "navigable stream, or bay of the sea, or harbor," to fill out to the channel, but
only if the owner was one "owning lands actually bounded by and extending to low water mark."
FLA. LAWS 1856, c. 791.
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and bounds description as the usual method of conveyance, particularly
for non-urban land.22 The government survey is anchored to the land at
32 initial points throughout the United States. These points are at
known latitudes and longitudes, determined by astronomical
observation. From each point principal meridians (North-South) and
base lines (East-West) are run, and the land area is laid out into
townships (36 sections) and sections (1 square mile or 640 acres) 3.2
In making a survey three steps are involved. The first is the actual
surveying of the land-the measuring of the land surface with
appropriate instruments and the identification or fixing of monuments.
The second is the making of field notes by the surveyor; these notes
constitute the written description of the survey. The third is the
preparation of the official plat or map, graphically depicting the facts
recorded in the notes. 24
From the conveyancer's viewpoint, the plat is a key document. The
description in a deed of conveyance will refer to a particular plat, and
will identify the particular tract being conveyed by symbols referring to
the tracts portrayed on the plat. The original plats (as well as the field
notes) are on file in the office of the Bureau of Land Management,
Department of the Interior, in Washington, D.C., (the Bureau is the
successor to the old General Land Office); copies of the relevant plats are
typically on file in local county recorder's offices.
It was inevitable that errors, both minor and major, would creep
into a project as huge as a nationwide survey of the public domain.
These errors typically reflect themselves in discrepancies between the
physical dimensions of the land as portrayed on the plat, and the di-
mentions revealed by retracing the steps of the first surveyor from
monument to monument. When there is such a discrepancy, the actual
survey is controlling. 2 In other words, it is the physical evidence on the
land that controls, and not the documents which purportedly but in-
accurately reflect that evidence.
When the government engineer in the course of making a survey
came to a large body of water, he "meandered" it. The current Manual
of Instructions describes the procedure in these words:
All navigable bodies of water and other important rivers
and lakes (as hereinafter described) are to be. segregated from
the public lands at mean high-water elevation, The traverse of
22. See generally I PATTON, supra note 13, at 288.
23. See generally MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS (1947).
24. When a planetable is used, the topographer constructs his plat or map as he surveys, thus
combining steps two and three. See2 SHALOiVITZ,supra note 12, at 85.
25. Texas Co. v. Slosberg, 112 Conn. 375, 152 A. 152 (1930); Stonewall Phosphate Co. v.
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the margin of a permanent natural body of water is termed a
meander line. In original surveys, meander lines are not run as
boundary lines but for the purpose of defining the sinuosites of
the bank or shoreline, and for ascertaining the quantity of land
remaining after segregation of the water area.26
The meander line, then, is the representation on the plat of the
approximate location of the water's edge; not infrequently the line will be
on the upland side of the actual water. Detailed instructions for running
a meander line are given the engineer in the Manual."
The representation of a meandered waterbody on a plat results in a
nonrectangular platted tract (exclusive of the bed). In such a case,
government engineers will generally subdivide the area being surveyed
into as many regular rectangular units as possible, using the quarter-
quarter section (40 acres) as the standard unit. Fractional units-those
smaller than 40 acres and having the meander line as a boundary-left
between the regular units and the waterbody will be designated as
government lots, and given numbers. 28
Government Survey Description Showing a Meander Line as a
Boundary
What is the riparian status of an owner of a government lot shown
on a government plat as having as one of its boundaries the meander line
of a waterbody? The basic rule is that the actual boundary of the lot is
not the meander line shown on the plat, but the high water line of the
waterbody itself, so long as they are substantially coincident. 29 The
Peyton, 39 Fla. 726, 23 So. 440 (1897); See I PATrON, supra note 13, at 390-91, and cases cited
therein.
26. MANUAL 230 (1947).
27. At every point where either standard, township or sections lines intersect the bank of
a navigable stream, or any meanderable body of water, corner monuments at such
intersections will be established at the time of running these lines. Such monuments are
called meander corners.... The engineer will commence the meander line at one of the
meander corners, follow the bank or shoreline, and determine the true bearing and
measure the exact length of each course, from the beginning to the next meander corner.
All meander courses are to be taken or counted from the true meridian and will be
determined with precision; "transit angles" showing only the amount of the deviation from
the preceding course are not acceptable in field notes of meanders. For convenience the
courses of meander lines should be adjusted to the exact quarter degree; meander lines are
not strict boundaries and this method will give approximate agreement with the minute
sinuosities of mean high-water elevation. Again, for convenience of platting and
computation, the engineer is required to adopt turning points at distances of whole chains,
or multiples of 10 links, with odd links only in the final course. In cases where the engineer
finds it impossible to carry his meander line along mean highwater mark, his notes should
state the distance therefrom and the obstacles which justify the deviation. MANUAL 232-33.
28. MANUAL 207-11 (1947).
29. Mitchell v. Smale, 140 U.S. 406 (1891); Lord v. Curry, 71 Fla. 68, 71 So. 21 (1916);
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narrow strip of land, if any, between the water's edge and the point where
the meander line would lay on the ground belongs to the lot owner, and
riparian rights attach.
The rule has not been uniformly recognized, however. At an earlier
date in Michigan, private ownership of land along Lake Michigan was
held not to extend beyond the meander line,30 but the upland owner had
riparian rights entitling him to access to the lake across the state-owned
strip between his land and the water's edge.3 The State of Washington
has taken the position that if the government plat shows a meander line
to be below the actual high water mark, a federal patent which was
issued or the right to which was vested prior to statehood conveys title to
the meander line, rather than stopping at the water's edge.32 Nebraska
appears to have rejected the basic rule and makes the meander line itself
the presumptive boundary.3
Another problem is presented by the cases in which the platted
meander line is far removed from the location of any actual waterbody.
This situation may arise if the water level has changed or the engineer
was either grossly mistaken or committed an outright fraud. The courts
have several alternatives. They can treat the meander line as the actual
boundary line, using the other calls of the deed to help establish its
location; they can extend the upland tract to the next quarter-section or
other survey line in the direction of the waterbody; or they can give the
upland owner the benefit of the error, and extend his ownership all the
way to the waterbody.
Most courts prefer the first alternative; 4 a few choose the second; 5
Arnold v. Brechtel, 174 Mich. 147, 140 N.W. 610 (1913); see I PATrON, supra note 13, at 297-99,
for four pages of case citations.
30. Aimsworth v. Munoskong Hunting Club, 159 Mich. 61, 123 N.W. 802 (1909) overruled
by Hilt v. Weber, 252 Mich. 198, 233 N.W. 159 (1930).
31. Staub v. Tripp, 248 Mich. 45, 226 N.W. 667 (1929), rev'don rehearing, 253 Mich. 633,
235 N.W. 844, (1931) on the authority of Hilt v. Weber, 252 Mich. 198, 233 N.W. 159 (1930); see
also Kavanaugh v. Baird, 241 Mich. 240, 217 N.W. 2 (1928) (denying the upland owner along Lake
Michigan the benefit of title by reliction), overruled by Hilt v. Weber, supra.
32. Mercer Island Beach Club v. Pugh, 53 Wash.2d 450,334 P.2d 534 (1959).
33. See, e.g., Harrison v. Stipes, 34 Neb. 431, 51 N.W. 976 (1892); but see McBride v.
Whitaker, 65 Neb. 137,90 N. W. 966 (1902).
34. See. e.g., Nites v. Cedar Point Club, 175 U.S. 300 (1899); French-Glenn Livestock Co. v.
Springer, 35 Ore. 312, 58 P. 102 (1899), affd, 185 U.S. 47 (1902); Security Land & Exploration Co.
v. Burns, 87 Minn. 97, 91 N.W. 304 (1902), affd, 193 U.S. 167 (1904).
35. See, e.g., Brown v. Clements, 44 U.S. 649 (1845) (surveyor could not arbitrarily divide
quarter section); Palmer v. Dodd, 64 Mich. 474, 31 N.W. 209 (1887); Whitney v. Detroit Lumber
Co., 78 Wis. 240, 47 N.W. 425 (1890); Lally v. Rossman, 82 Wis. 147, 51 N.W. 1132 (1892);
(section subdivided into sections; boundary extends to next "eighth line"); Underwood v. Smith,
109 Wis. 334, 85 N.W. 384 (1901); but see Baackes v. Blair, 223 Wis. 83, 269 N.W. 650 (1936)
(intent of government to grant land to lake controlling where it is unnecessary to cross subdivision
lines).
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and the third seems to be unacceptable, although it is the only choice that
would appear to give the owner riparian rights.16
THE PLATTED STREET PROBLEM
The Dimensions of the Problem
In urban areas, it is the practice today to convey smaller parcels of
land, such as those for residential use, by reference to a locally-prepared
map or plat. Not infrequently the plat will be an expanded treatment of
a portion of the plat of the government survey for that section, and will
be anchored to the ground by reference to a described corner or monu-
ment on the government plat. If the local plat shows a meander line of
a waterbody, the problems and solutions regarding riparian ownership
are essentially the same as those discussed in the preceding section. 7
In addition to subdividing the tract into lots and parcels, the local
plat will often show streets and other areas dedicated to public use. Such
streets may abut on a platted waterbody, either by running along and
paralleling the shoreline, or by running down to and terminating at the
water's edge. In either case, if the dedication of the street constitutes a
vesting of the fee in the public, rather than a grant of an easement for
street purposes, and riparian rights have not been validly reserved by the
dedicator, the riparian rights will be in the public."'
If the effect of the dedication is to grant only an easement, and this
is the usual construction placed upon dedications of this type,39 the
question arises whether the riparian rights attach to the easement, so that
the public has them, or whether they remain in the owner of the fee.
Furthermore, if the fee owner subsequently conveys lots abutting on the
street, his grantees may become additional claimants to the riparian
rights, based on an express or implied conveyance of the fee in the
contiguous portion of the street.
Analytically, the distinction between the street that parallels the
waterbody and the street that runs to and terminates in it becomes
important. In the latter situation several points are undisputed. First, the
waterbody end of the street is typically clearly in contact with the
waterbody, so that there is no question that it is riparian upland.
Secondly, the ownership of the fee in the street is determined under the
36. But see Barringer v. Davis, 141 Iowa 419, 120 N.W. 65 (1909); see also Baackes v. Blair,
223 XWis. 83, 269 N.W. 650 (1936).
37. See, e.g., Lally v. Rossman, 82 Wis. 147, 51 N.W. 1132 (1892); Blatchford v. Voss, 197
Wis. 461, 219 N.W. 100, affd on rehearing, 222 N.W. 804 (1929).
38. Webb v. City of Demopolis, 95 Ala. 116, 13 So. 289 (1892); St. Louis v. Missouri Pac.
Ry. Co., 114 Mo. 13,21 S.W. 202 (1893);seegenerally I FARNHAM § 144.
39. See4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1112 (3d ed. 1939).
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usual rules, including a presumption that the conveyance of an abutting
lot carries with it the fee to the center of the street, there being dry land
on both sides of it.40 Thirdly, it appears obvious that the purpose of
platting the street in that fashion is to provide access from the upland
streets down to and into the water. Accordingly it would follow that the
dedication of the street easement should carry with it by implication the
riparian rights, or at least those riparian rights that are material to the
public's access to the waterbody.41
If the street easement runs along and parallels the shoreline, the
three issues discussed above may individually or collectively enter the
dispute. In the first place, it may not be at all clear that the street touches
the waterbody, that is, that the water-side edge of the platted street is
coextensive with the high water mark of the waterbody. This depends in
substantial measure on the manner in which the plat was drawn.
Secondly, the rules governing ownership of the land underlying a
street easement run into the complication that, if the street does border
the water, there are abutting lots only on the one side of it. If the
ownership presumption runs only to the center of the street, the original
proprietor rather than the upland owner owns the land in contact with
the waterbody and thus may own any appurtenant riparian rights.
Thirdly, assuming the fee in the street is owned by either the original
proprietor or his subsequent grantees, the key question remains, was the
purpose of platting the street in this fashion to give public access to the
water from the edge of the street, or was it simply to give the public a
right-of-way along the land, parallel to the water; were the riparian
rights dedicated by implication along with the easement, or did they
remain in the dedicator? Asking the question in this way, as the courts
sometimes do, may tend to obscure the real issue. Riparian rights are not
a unity-they are rights entitling a riparian owner to do a variety of acts
with relationship to the water, and in some cases to the underlying bed.
Some of these acts might be compatible with both the upland ownership
and with the public use of the easement, others might not. The question
might better be rephrased to ask: what rights ordinarily attributable to
riparian ownership should logically be considered as accompanying a
dedication to the public of a street easement abutting on a navigable
waterbody; and what rights ordinarily attributable to riparian ownership
would, if exercised by an upland riparian owner, be inconsistent with or
unduly hamper such an easement?
40. See discussion in text accompanying notes 63-71.
41. See Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1876); Cartish v. Soper, 157 So. 2d 150 (2d Dist. Ct.
App. Fla. 1963) (street ran down to Bay); Geigor v. Filor, 8 Fla. 325 (1859) (street ran down to
Atlantic Ocean) see generally I FARNHAM § 144a.
JOURNAL OF URBAN LAW
Approaches to the Problem
Because of its contemporary significance, and because of the
sparsity of modern cases, the parallel street situation will be explored
here in some detail, with particular reference to the three points
identified above. The discussion will center around the recent Florida
case of Burkart v. Fort Lauderdale,42 a case which involved each of these
points, and in which there were divergences of opinion among the trial
court, the majority and dissenting judges in the District Court of Appeal,
and the Supreme Court.
The Burkart case began in 1921, when the owner of a tract of land,
bordering on New River Sound, a navigable waterbody, recorded a plat
of the land which showed the property divided into a large number of lots
and blocks, with various streets spaced between the blocks. On the east
edge of the tract was a street labelled "Ocean View Drive," running
between the waterbody and the first tier of lots paralleling the Sound.
The plat contained a dedication which read in part: "The streets,
avenues and Ocean View Drive, shown hereon are hereby dedicated to
the perpetual use of the public as thoroughfares, reserving to the
[dedicator] the reversion or reversions thereof, whenever discontinued by
law." 3 In addition, the dedication provided that "the riparian rights in
and to the waters of New River and New River Sound opposite each lot
or parcel of land fronting or abutting upon Ocean View Drive are hereby
reserved to the [dedicator and its assigns], owners of said abutting lots or
parcels of land." 44
The dedicator constructed streets, pavements, and sidewalks and
sold lots according to the plat. By mesne conveyances from the
dedicator, the plaintiffs became the owners of several of the lots fronting
on Ocean View Drive opposite the Sound. The deeds in plaintiffs' chain
of title from the dedicator contained a paragraph reciting that:
The strip or parcel of land lying between Ocean View Drive and
New River Sound and New River, in front of each lot fronting
on Ocean View Drive is hereby conveyed to the owner of said
lot together with such riparian rights and privileges as are
owned by the [dedicator] .41
The defendant was the city within which the land was situated.
Plaintiffs and defendant became embroiled in an argument over
42. 156 So.2d 752 (2d Dist.Ct.App. Fla. 1963) affd in part and rev'd in part, 168 So.2d 65
(Fla. 1964).
43. 156 So.2d at 754-55.
44. Id. at 754.
45. !d. at 756.
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their respective rights. Plaintiffs claimed they owned the narrow strip of
land which now existed east of the road, and that they had the right to
improve it with fill. The city denied plaintiffs' ownership, and by formal
resolution of intent claimed the power to regulate the activities of
persons attempting to use the water adjacent to every public street in the
city. Plaintiffs then filed suit to enjoin the city from asserting any title or
riparian rights with respect to the land in question. There were three
basic issues to be decided.
(1.) Does the platted street reach to the water's edge?
The first issue was whether the city could claim any riparian rights
on behalf of the public stemming from the dedication of Ocean View
Drive. The answer depended on whether Ocean View Drive, as platted,
was in contact with the water's edge, or whether a strip of land had been
left between the street and the Sound. If the latter, the city would have
no claim to riparian rights, as it would .have no property abutting on the
water. (In this case, control over plaintiffs' activities would have to be
based on the city's general police powers. Because plaintiffs were
apparently claiming the right to fill under a state statute granting that
right to riparian owners, the city's police powers would presumably be
ineffective to prevent plaintiffs from proceeding.)"
The evidence was conflicting. The plat itself appeared as shown
on page 54.47
As noted previously, the deeds out from the dedicator of the upland
lots made reference to a strip of land east of the street, and there
apparently were separate deeds from the dedicator purporting to convey
these strips.4 On the other hand, there was expert testimony that the
wavy lines shown on the plat immediately east of the east edge of Ocean
View Drive were standard engineering symbols indicating a water
boundary. These lines paralleled and appeared to touch in several places
the solid line on the east side of the street. But why the solid line? If the
eastern edge of the street was in fact the water, the solid line would seem
to be inappropriate-it represents a land boundary, not a water one.
There are several techniques for representing the land-water
boundary when a street is platted paralleling a waterbody. Each creates
problems of interpretation.
46. Plaintiffs' complaint alleged they had the right to fill in the submerged land in front of
their uplands by virtue of the state's Riparian Rights Act of 1856 and supplementary statutes,
presumably the Butler Bill of 1921. These acts wererepealed in 1957 (FLA. LAWS 1957,57 - 362 § 9)
eleven years after the complaint was filed but threeyears before the trial court decision. The effect of
the repeal was not considered by the courts, and the outcome of the case made the point moot.
47. See plat infra page 54.
48. Id. at 756. It is not clear to whom these conveyances were made.
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(a.) The Barclay Case Technique
One technique is to indicate the upland edge of the street by the
usual solid line, and leave the outboard edge of the street undrawn. This
was the technique used by an eighteenth century surveyor named George
Woods in 1784 when he platted the town of Pittsburgh along the
Monongahela River. With the exception of Water Street, which lays
along the bank of the Monongahela, all of the platted streets were clearly
delineated, and their widths established. Water Street was shown by an
upland boundary line and a name, but the water-side boundary was
omitted.
In 1829, plaintiff brought ejectment in the United States District
Court in Pennsylvania claiming ownership, by virtue of certain
conveyances from the original dedicator, of a tract of land between the
roadway of Water Street and the river's edge. The city defended on the
ground that the entire strip of land between the upland line of Water
Street and the river had been dedicated to the public as a street when the
plat was laid out.
In reversing a judgment for plaintiff, the United States Supreme
Court observed:
There is nothing.., on the plat which shows any limits to
the width of Water Street, short of the river on the south. If a
line had been drawn along its southern limit, there would have
been great force in the argument that the ground between such
limit and thie water was reserved by the proprietors. This would
have been the legal consequence from such a survey, unless the
contrary had been shown.49
The contrary could be shown, presumably, by proper notations on
the plat. Could it be shown by the statements of the plat-maker?
Defendant city offered into evidence depositions of two witnesses for the
purpose of establishing certain declarations by Woods at the time he
made the survey. These declarations supported the idea that the street
was intended to run to the low-water mark of the river. Plaintiff objected
to the evidence. The Supreme Court said:
Woods had authority to fix upon the plan of the town, and
survey it.
It must be admitted that the declarations of an agent,
respecting things done within the scope of his authority, are not
evidence to charge his principal, unless they were made at the
time the act was done, and formed a part of the transaction....
49. Barclay v. Howell's Lessee, 31 U.S. 498,504 (1832).
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The southern limit of Water Street was the point of inquiry
before the jury. It was a question of boundary, and governed by
the same rules of evidence which are of daily application in such
a case. In this view, were not the declarations of the person who
fixed the boundary legal evidence? Not declarations casually
made at a different time from that at which the survey was
executed, but at the very time the act was done. The proof of
such declarations should have been admitted by the [trial]
court; because, under the circumstances, they formed a part of
the transaction.50
(b.) The Brickell Case Technique
The problem of construing a platted land/water boundary had come
before the Florida Supreme Court in an earlier case, Brickell v. Fort
Lauderdale,' coincidentally involving the same city and the same river.
The Brickell case arose in 1896 when William and Mary Brickell
platted the mile-square area comprising the original town site of Ft.
Lauderdale. New River ran almost through the center of the area
platted, in an east-west direction. On the plat, along each side of the
river, there was shown a street paralleling the river, labelled North
River Street and South River Street. The lines indicating the upland
sides of the streets (away from the river) were straight lines, broken
periodically by cross streets running at right angles to the river streets.
The line denominating the river side of both North and South River
streets was a solid, undulating line. The plat contained on its face a
written dedication of the platted streets52 quite similar to the one used
in Burkart. The plat had been duly recorded.
About twenty years later, Fort Lauderdale sued Mary Brickell to
enjoin her from obstructing the rights-of-way of North and South River
streets by the erection of buildings and wharves along the water front.
Mary Brickell's answer alleged ownership of the strip of land between
the roadway of North and South River streets and the water.
At the trial, Brickell contended that the plat was ambiguous on the
question of whether the platted street ran to the water's edge. At several
places along the length of South River street as it was shown on the plat,
the figure "40" appeared, presumably indicating a 40 foot width. On
closer examination, it could be seen that the distance between the
50. Id. at 503-04.
51. 75 Fla. 622,78So. 681 (1918).
52. "[W]e do hereby dedicate [sic] to the perpetual use of the public, the streets or highways
shown thereon, reserving to ourselves [and successors], owning lands abutting or adjoining the
same, the reversion or reversions thereof whenever discontinued by law." Id. at 623, 78 So. at 68 1.
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straight line on the plat and the undulating line was, to scale, generally
about 40 feet, although it varied* as the undulating line (representing
the water side of the street) varied. Brickell contended that this created
a sufficient ambiguity to warrant admission of extrinsic evidence of
the intention of the dedicators. The trial court heard the evidence and
then concluded that both North and South River streets were bounded
by the waters of New River.
On appeal, this finding was affirmed. The Florida Supreme Court
said:
The lines marking the side of the North and South River
streets, away from the river, are all straight lines, while those
which mark the side next to the river are undulating and
apparently follow the contour of the river. A single undulating
line is usually used for marking a water boundary not affected
by tides, while several parallel waved lines are used to mark a
water boundary where tides ebb and flow; and where these are
found on a plat, they should be taken to define a lot or street
lying on the water, with nothing between it and the water, in the
absence of anything appearing to the contrary on the plat, or in
the dedication.13
Regarding the testimony offered by Mary Brickell, the court noted:
There is intrinsic evidence in the plat itself, from which the
true intention of the appellant at the time she made the
dedication can almost conclusively be established-at least,
more certainly than the testimony of witnesses given after a
lapse of nearly 20 years, subject as such testimony is to
mistakes caused by defective memory, personal interest
however slight, and the confusion of after-acquired information
or later impressions, with memory. 4
The court was not reluctant to explain the motivation for its
holding. If Mary Brickell's position was correct, "the inhabitants of one
side of the city were entirely cut off from intercourse with the other, for
there is no point shown on the plat where ingress and egress to and from
the river was possible without permission from the owner, or by
becoming a trespasser."55 While it was presumably possible for a
developer to do this, "the unreasonableness of such a plan for a city, and
the improbability of one so situated becoming populated, is so great,
that such intention on the part of the dedicators would have to be very
53. Id. at 627,78 So. at 683.
54. Id. at 628,78 So. at 683.
55. Id. at 628-29,78 So. at 683.
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clearly established... [and] any doubt as to such intention ... should be
resolved against it."56
(c.) The Burkart Case Technique
In Burkart, on the other hand, the platted street was shown by
straight lines on both sides, with the line on the water side paralleled by
the several wavy lines." The district court of appeal pointed out that the
record contained uncontradicted testimony of experts to the effect that
the wavy lines were standard engineering symbols indicating a water
boundary. The district court then cited Brickell for the proposition that
in the absence of anything to the contrary, such lines "should be taken to
define a lot or street lying adjacent to the water." 8 As to the fact that the
platted street was bounded on both sides by solid straight lines the
district court said:
The solid, heavy line marking the east boundary of Ocean
View Drive is clearly for the purpose of showing the distance
from the west line of the Drive to the water. The wavy,
undulating lines adjacent to the solid line, and touching the
solid line from time to time with insignificant variations, make
it clear that Ocean View Drive was dedicated and platted as
extending to the shore of New River Sound. 9
Concerning the testimony offered by the plaintiff's witnesses, the
court noted that "the [trial] court found that there is intrinsic evidence in
the plat itself from which the true intention of the maker can be almost
conclusively established-at least more certainly than the statements of
witnesses testifying after a lapse of... years .. .."60 The district court of
appeal,6" and subsequently the supreme court,62 concurred with the
chancellor's resolution of the evidentiary conflict in favor of the plat.
56. Id. at 633,78 So. at 684.
57. Burkart v. Fort Lauderdale, 156 So.2d 752, 755 (1963); see plat reproduced supra.
58. Id. at 756.
59. Id. The Florida Supreme Court concurred with the district court of appeal on this point.
168 So.2d at 67.
60. The exact words of the district court of appeal were: "The court found that there is intrin-
sic evidence in the plat itself from which the true intention of the maker can be almost conclusively
established-at least more certainly than the statements of witnesses testifying after a lapse of near-
ly twenty years, since such testimony is subject to mistakes caused by defective memory and the
confusion of after-acquired information or later impressions with memory" 156 So. 2d at 756. This
language appears to be almost identical to that of the Supreme Court in Brickell v. Fort Lauder-
dale, 75 Fla. 622, 628, 78 So. 681, 683 (1918), including the reference to twenty years, which fit the
facts of Brickell, but did not fit in Burkart.
61. 156 So.2d at 757.
62. 168 So.2dat67.
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(2.) Who Owns the Street?
Once it is determined that the edge of a street abuts on the water's
edge, ownership of the street becomes important in deciding who owns
the riparian rights. As discussed in a previous section, if the fee is in
the public, and there has been no reservation of riparian rights by the
dedicator, the riparian rights are in the public. I f the public owns only an
easement, the fee and perhaps riparian rights appurtenant to it are in
either the original dedicator or in some successor to his interests, such as
a grantee of a parcel of his upland abutting on the street.
As between the dedicator and his grantee, the grantee lot owner
must base his claim for riparian rights on an express or implied
conveyance by the dedicator of the entire fee in the street, thus putting
the lot owner in contact with the water. If the deed from the original
dedicator expressly grants the fee in the street without reservation of
riparian rights, there is no problem; the fee and any attendant riparian
rights are in the grantee.
However, "in the more usual case, the deed will purport to convey a
lot shown on the plat as bounded by the street easement, without
reference to the fee in the abutting street. There is a well recognized rule
that a conveyance of land abutting on an easement for street purposes
will carry with it the fee in half of the abutting street (assuming the
grantor owns it) unless a contrary intention is indicated.63
As a general proposition this rule makes good sense. It avoids the
undesirable situation of having long, narrow strips of land under
highway easements owned by parties who have no interest in the
adjoining properties. Implicit in the rule, however, are two assumptions.
First, that there are usable tracts on each side of the easement; and
second, that the tracts were owned by the same person prior to the
creation of the easement.14 The first assumption is the problem here. If
the street easement runs along the edge of a navigable waterbody, so that
there is usable land on only one side, an application of the rule would
give half the fee to the abutting upland owner, and leave the other half in
the original dedicator. This would still leave a long narrow strip of land
in isolated ownership, a result opposite that which the rule is designed to
achieve.
63. See 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939): "[A] conveyance of land as bounded 'on'
or 'by', or as running 'along' a highway, will convey to the centerline of the highway, if the grantor
owns thereto, unless a contrary intention appears from the conveyance...."
64. The reason for the second assumption is illustrated by the situation in which a street
easement is created on a tract of land wholly owned by A; the easement abuts on B's land, but does
not include any part of it. Conveyance by B of his land will clearly not raise a presumption that any
ofA's land underlying the easement is included in the conveyance.
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What are the alternatives? Leaving the entire fee in the street in the
original dedicator is hardly an improvement over leaving him half. The
other alternative is to give the entire fee to the upland owner. This puts
his land in contact with the water, and he becomes the riparian owner,
absent a reservation of riparian rights by the original dedicator. This
result on the whole would seem to make the best sense.
In the Barclay case,65 discussed above, the Supreme Court stated
that the common law rule was that the fee in the soil remained in the
original owner when a public road was established over it; only an
easement of use was in the public. The Court found it unnecessary to
decide if this were the rule in the case before it, as a finding of an interest
in the public, either the fee or an easement, would be enough to defeat the
plaintiff's claim. The Court did comment in passing, however, that:
Where the proprietor of a town deposes of all his interest
in it, he would seem to stand in a different relation to the right
of soil, in regard to the streets and alleys of the town, from the
individual over whose soil a public road is established, and who
continues to hold land on both sides of it. Whether the
purchasers of town lots are not, in this respect, the owners of
the soil over which the streets and alleys are laid, as
appurtenant to the adjoining lots, is a point not essentially
involved in this case."
In the Brickell case, the trial court had held that the fee in the land
over which North and South River streets were laid out was in the
original dedicators, the Brickells, subject to the easement in the public.67
The Florida Supreme Court, once it agreed that the dedicated street
extended to the water's edge, simply concluded that "where a dedication
to the public use is made of a street or roadway, and the same is used by
the public, it is the duty of the city as trustee of the public rights in and to
the streets within whose corporate limits they are, to maintain the public
uses against encroachments....""
It is important to recognize that in both Barclay and Brickell the
public's antagonist premised his case on ownership of an alleged parcel
of land lying between the platted street and the water's edge at the time
the street was dedicated. Once it was determined that the street, as
platted, ran to the water, the case was lost regardless of who owned the
fee in the street.
Similarly, in Burkart the plaintiffs claimed ownership of an alleged
65. Barclay v. Howell's Lessee, 31 U.S. 498 (1832).
66. Id. at 513-14.
67. Brickell v. Fort Lauderdale, 75 Fla. 622, 624,78 So. 681, 682 (1918).
68. Id. at 633,78 So. at 685
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strip of land between the street and the water. But they further claimed
the right to fill in from the upland toward the channel, a right which
allegedly accrued to the upland owner by virtue of his riparian status.
Thus, it was not enough to defeat plaintiffs' claim to find that no such
strip existed, if in fact plaintiffs owned the land under the street abutting
on the water, and if the right to fill attached to that land.
The trial court in Burkart and both appellate courts agreed that the
street as originally platted ran to the water's edge; there was no
intervening strip of land. They further agreed that any additional upland,
built up by accretion after the 1921 dedication, belonged to the owner of
the fee in the street but was impressed with the street easement. This left
to be decided the question of who owned the fee in the street. The district
court of appeal, noting that the courts were divided and local precedent
was lacking, baldly stated that "we are of the view that.., by virtue of
their ownership of the lots fronting on Ocean View Drive, the plaintiffs
own the fee underlying the Drive across its entire width."69 The supreme
court, with even briefer examination, concurred: "The petitioners
undoubtedly own the fee to the street. . . ."I' As mentioned above, this
result makes good sense, and has been the one generally reached by
courts that have considered the question.'
(3.) Who owns what riparian rights?
If the upland owner owns the fee in the entire street, including
accretions, he owns land abutting on a waterbody, and presumably is a
riparian owner. If the public owns a street easement over land abutting
on a waterbody, it also can claim contact with the waterbody, and
riparian status.
The trial court in Burkart had decided that the totality of riparian
rights was in the city, and that none remained in the upland owner, at
least so long as the city owned the street easement. With this position a
majority of the district court of appeal was in accord:
[T]he dedication of Ocean View Drive, which abuts upon
public waters, must be construed as operating to relinquish to
the public, and to merge in the public right, the dedicator's
individual riparian rights to the navigable waters. It would be
unreasonable and contrary to law to permit a private right to
exist which could be exercised hostilely to the public right.72
69. 156So.2dat 758.
70. 168 So.2d at 68.
71. Eg., Murrell v. United States, 269 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 962
(1960); Johnson v. Grenell, 188 N.Y. 407, 81 N.E. 161 (1907); Gifford v. Horton, 54 Wash. 595,
103 P. 988 (1909); Taylor v. Armstrong, 24 Ark. 102 (1863).
72. 156So.2dat761.
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There is substantial precedent for this position. In a variety of
circumstances involving similar issues, courts have often held that the
right of ingress and egress accompanied the easement into the hands of
the public; in effect, the upland owner's private right of access "merged"
into the public right.73 And, when the public obtained the right of access,
they also obtained the right to wharf.74
Judge White, dissenting in the district court decision in Burkart,
pointed out that the position taken by the majority conceivably would
permit the city to erect a marina or establish a public beach along the
easement:
Assuming that these facilities would not conflict with
plaintiffs' privileges possessed in common with the public, they
would certainly conflict with the . . . private right of the
plaintiffs to unobstructed view and enjoyment of the waterfront,
anchorage and wharfage privileges and unimpeded right of
ingress and egress to and from their lots and the water."5
Judge White's conclusion was that the riparian rights should not be
treated as an indivisible package of privileges attached exclusively to the
easement. The easement could be protected without endowing it with
attributes "over and beyond those reasonably incident to its prescribed
use," 76 and without affording it riparian rights "extending past the land's
edge." ' 7 He did agree with the majority, however, that "it would be
inconsistent with the easement to permit the plaintiffs to fill the
submerged land. ' 78 It should be noted that there is some inconsistency
between the last statement and the argument that the city's interest did
not extend beyond the land's edge.
What Judge White seemed to be saying was that the law should
protect both the city and the upland owner as their interests appeared,
and should "apportion" the riparian rights accordingly. This,
presumably, would mean, in the case before him, giving the fee interest in
any accreted land to the upland owner, while at the same time extending
the city's easement to include such accretions, thus keeping the easement
in touch with the water. This much the majority of the court had also
73. See, e.g., Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 340 (1876); McCloskey v. Pacific Coast Co.,
160 F. 794, 797 (9th Cir. 1908) (dictum); (Gastineaux Channel, an arm of the North Pacific Ocean,
Alaska); Pewaukee v. Savoy, 103 Wis. 271, 79 N.W. 436 (1899).
74. Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1876); Backus v. Detroit, 49 Mich. 110, 13 N.W. 380
(1882); Geigor v. Filor, 8 Fla. 325 (1859) (Atlantic Ocean); Rowan's Ex'rs v. Portland, 47 Ky. 232,
253-258 (1848); accord, Turner v. People's Ferry Co., 21 F. 90 (1884).
75. 156 So.2d at 764-65.
76. Id. at 766.
77. Id. at 765.
78. Id. at 762-63.
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agreed to. Judge White, however, would further deny to both the public
and the upland owner the right to build out from the land's edge in such a
way as to interfere with each other's unrestricted right of access to the
water. While the majority did not address itself specifically to that
question, the clear implication, at least as Judge White saw it, was that
the public would have the right to interfere with the upland owner's
access, but not vice versa.
The Florida Supreme Court, on certiorari," found itself in
substantial agreement with Judge White, and adopted much of his
reasoning, adding, however, two points of its own. One point helped; the
other confused.
The helpful point followed from Judge White's suggestion that the
public's use of the easement could be protected without depriving the
upland owner of all riparian rights. The court agreed with this, and then
clarified the point by stating that the public's use "is not limited solely to
travel upon the street, but includes the general public's right to use the
accreted property as a way of ingress and egress to the waters of New
River Sound."'" By thus interpreting the dedication of the original
easement as including, under the circumstances, not only a public right
to travel upon the street from and to connecting streets and abutting
upland, but also the right to use the street as a passageway to the
adjacent public waterway, the court avoided the apparent inconsistency
found in Judge White's position. If the public has as part of the street
easement the right to pass from the street onto the water, it would follow
that the upland owner should not be able at the same time to exercise an
inconsistent right, such as the right to build his own wharf over the
objection of the public.'
The confusing point results from the significance the court
attributed to the fact that the original dedicators had reserved the
riparian rights connected with the lots abutting on Ocean View Drive. 2
One view of the case might suggest that the reservation was essentially
irrelevant, inasmuch as the dedicators subsequently conveyed the
reserved rights to the purchasers of the upland lots, who, it turned out,
owned to the water's edge. In effect the two transactions were self-
79. 168 So.2d 65 (Fla. 1964).
80. Id. at 70.
81. See discussion supra; seegenerally I FARNHAM § 144a.
82. The language of the reservation as it appeared on the plat was: '... The riparian rights
in and to the waters of New River and New River Sound opposite each lot or parcel of land fronting
or abutting upon Ocean View Drive are hereby reserved to the New River Development Company,
its successors, legal representatives or assigns, owners of said abutting lots or parcels of land."
156 So.2d at 754.
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cancelling, the upland owner ending up with the same riparian rights he
would have had if there had been no reservation and subsequent
conveyance.
This approach, however, does not appear to be the position taken by
the supreme court. That court agreed with Judge White's dissent that the
majority of the district court of appeal had gone too far in conferring on
the city the totality of the riparian rights. But then, instead of adopting
his "apportionment" theory, the court seemed to suggest that the totality
of riparian rights had, as a consequence of the original dedicator's
reservation, remained with him and his successors, the upland owners:
We conclude that because of the express reservation of
riparian rights by the dedicator herein to itself and assigns,
contained in the plat herein, these rights did not pass to the
public as an incident to the street easement in Ocean View
Drive. 3
The court then went on to point out, however, that the upland owners
"should be adjudged owners of... such riparian rights and privileges as
have been reserved in the dedication, and which do not burden the
easement dedicated. . .. -"4 The decision of the district court of appeal
was therefore quashed.
An explanation of the court's concern with the fact of the
reservation can be found in the way in which the Burkart case got to the
supreme court from the district court of appeal. An earlier case, Tarpon
Springs v. Smith," had involved a Brickell type claim by an upland
owner of an alleged strip of land between a platted street, Anclote
Boulevard, and the Anclote River, a navigable tidal stream. The
particular strip involved was alleged to be a marshy area nine feet wide at
one end and 525 feet wide at the other. Plaintiff sought reformation of
his deed from his grantor to correct the description so that it
encompassed the entire strip instead of just a part.
The city of Tarpon Springs was joined in the action. The city denied
that such a strip existed, and claimed that the platted street was intended
by the dedicator to abut on the waterbody for its entire length. The city
asked that the court so decree, and that it further decree that the city "be
invested with and to have in trust for the public the dedication of all
riparian rights in and to the shore space of the Anclote River .... ",,
Thus, the city, by affirmative counterclaim, changed the suit into a
Burkart type action for riparian rights.
83. 168 So.2d at 70.
84. Id. (emphasis added).
85. 81 Fla.479,88So. 613(1921).
86. Id. at 490, 88 So. at 617.
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The plat, which covered not only the tract involved, but surrounding
areas, showed a wavy line, presumably the river's meander line,
touching on the river-side of the platted boulevard at several points, and
leaving a sizeable strip between the river and the boulevard at other
points. At the location of the locus in quo, the plat showed a space "of
considerable size" between the boulevard line and the river line. 7 The
trial court found that the alleged strip in fact existed as upland, and
granted reformation. The judge dismissed the city's claim for relief. On
rehearing, the judge amended his decree to provide that it was without
prejudice to the possible riparian rights of the city at those places where
the boulevard line and the river line touched. On appeal, the Florida
Supreme Court affirmed. Towards the end of its opinion, the court
commented that:
The dedication by the owner under the particular town
plat, showing streets, etc., manifestly did not give any easement
or other rights beyond the expressly designated limits of the
streets and the incidents that are appropriate thereto. Wherever
the street, Anclote Boulevard, as delineated by line and stated
width, touches or approximately touches the body of the
Anclote River, the riparian rights that are appropriate to a
street easement were also impliedly dedicated as an incident,
there being no express or implied reservation by the dedicator of
such riparian rights. See Brickell v. Town of Fort Lauderdale,
75 Fla. 622, 78 South. Rep. 681.8
Obviously the reference to a reservation by the original dedicator was
obiter dictum, as no reservation was involved in the case.
In Burkart, the supreme court was asked to take the case on
certiorari. In granting certiorari, the court found implicit in its
"holding" in the Tarpon Springs case "the principle that riparian rights
do not pass as an incident to the street easement where there is an express
reservation by the dedicator of such riparian rights .. "89 This
"principle," the court decided, was in conflict with the theory of the
majority of the district court of appeal in Burkart, and for that matter
with the theory of the dissent, both of which had attributed at least some
riparian rights to the holder of the street easement. The basis, then, for
the court's assumption of jurisdiction was a supposed conflict between
its prior decision in Tarpon Springs and the district court's decision in
Burkart on the effect of an express reservation: -Once having assumed
87. Id. at 496, 88 So. at 619.
88. /d.at501,88So.at621.
89. 168So.2dat 68.
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jurisdiction by this somewhat bootstrap construction, the court was not
bound to attach major importance to the reservation, but it is not
surprising that it did.
In summary it should be noted that all the judges-the trial court,
the majority of the district court of appeal, the dissenting judge, and the
supreme court-were in agreement that the plaintiffs in Burkart did not
have a good case. They did not own the upland strip free of the public's
right to use it, as they claimed; and they could not wharf or fill out to the
channel as they desired. The trial court and the district court's majority
explained this result by giving the riparian rights, as a package, to the
public; the district court dissenter's theory was to apportion the riparian
rights between the parties, while denying both of them the right to wharf
or fill. The supreme court justified its conclusion by apparently giving
the riparian rights, as a package, to the upland owner, but then
expanding the character of the public easement to include rights that
looked just 'like riparian rights. Of the three positions, Judge White's
concept of apportioning the riparian rights among the competing
claimants in a way that protects the relative position of both has much to
commend it. It provides a technique for protecting fully the public's
present interest while at the same time preserving the upland owner's
rights to both present and future enjoyment, the latter in the event of a
termination of the easement; it allows for maximum flexibility in
tailoring the apportionment to meet different factual situations; and it is
not inconsistent with what reasonably could be expected to be the intent
of the original dedicator.
Whether the intent to allocate appropriate riparian rights to the
public could be negatived by express language in the dedication is a
question left unanswered by the "apportionment" theory. Today, many
cities require approval by an appropriate governmental board of all
proposed subdivision plats. The public's interest in situations like
Burkart could be protected by refusing approval to plats purporting to
withhold or reserve riparian rights reasonably incident to the public's
easement.
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